; Korzybski, A. (1933)
In a letter to Marjorie Cameron ca. 1949-1950, Jack Parsons wrote:
Hubbard defined Aristotelian logic as "two-valued," the logic of engineers as three-valued, and claimed that his "infinity-valued" logic system jumped beyond the engineers' logic. Scientologists universally pride themselves for their "infinity-valued," and of course superior, logic. Their logic is anything but superior, and their infinity-valued logic turns out to be a system for rationalizing their leaders' illogic and arbitraries.
L. Ron Hubbard wrote:
L. Ron Hubbard wrote:
Scientology seeks to separate the thetan from the body, to "exteriorize" the thetan, and thereafter process the thetan, so that
"operates" according to Hubbard's laws, axioms, and most importantly executes Hubbard's/Miscavige's/R & R's/*.cult leader's "Command Intention." Hubbard discusses how his ideas about thetans and exteriorization disagree with Korzybski and General Semantics in the following 1954 lecture.
Hubbard falsely claims that General Semantics was then being taught in every university in the land. He continues to tramp on the subject with the same black PR as in his earlier lectures; e.g., it teaches "students that nobody really knows what anybody else is talking about." He adds in some newly manufactured black PR; e.g., "Words, to a general semanticist, become lumps of lead;" "these general semanticists get ridges [...] they get tongue-tied and go out of communication." He even asserts that studying General Semantics "makes madmen out of them."
Calling Korzybski "Alfred Lord Korzybski" is not a slip of Hubbard's forked tongue, but a willful put-down. Korzybski is known to have been a Polish count. The "Alfred Lord" of course belongs to Tennyson.
Boy, did Hubbard ever have crimes on Korzybski and General Semantics. Hubbard gave up his study of the subject, he claims here, after ten minutes. He had a whole bank full of misunderstood and crimes. Fortunately he tipped us off in this lecture excerpt to his criminality with a pair of highly precise
L. Ron Hubbard wrote:
We will now take up R1-10. R1-10: Route 1-10, an exteriorization drill or process
Route 1-10 is not solely confined to Route 1. You will find it also over in Route 2. This step is "Have preclear discover things he wouldn't mind occupying the same space with him." Now, that is the idea behind all havingness. You can only have something when you've got a universe or when you've got some space. And to get an individual over the idea of havingness, it's only necessary to ask him many, many times "What wouldn't you mind occupying your same space now? Give me something else that you wouldn't mind occupying your space." He'll tell you air, water, ideas. Anything he tells you, you don't care; you just want the question answered. "What wouldn't you mind occupying the same space with you?" And again, "What wouldn't you mind occupying the same space? What wouldn't you mind occupying the same space?"
Now, this is not a short process. You can keep this process up with an individual for a couple of hours, always with benefit. It can be run on somebody inside or outside. When you run it on somebody who is exteriorized, he's liable to have the devil's own time trying to figure out how he could get something to occupy the same space he's occupying, particularly if he's in good shape. But he's got to manage this. He's got to know what this is all about. Really, he will move around and occupy the same space as other objects for a while, and do all sorts of things. You're not interested too much in what he's doing, you just want to give him the process and get him finally into the idea that things can occupy the same space as a thetan.
What you are knocking to pieces is the basic postulate which makes a universe possible, and you are knocking that postulate to pieces. And this is simply this: the basic postulate is—for any universe which has space and energy—"Two things cannot occupy the same space." Alfred Lord Korzybski did not invent this. It was invented about seventy-four trillion years ago for this universe.
"Two things cannot occupy the same space."
If you will study General Semantics, you will discover that they teach this and it makes madmen out of them. They teach you "Two things cannot occupy the same space! Those two are not the same cigarette; they are two different cigarettes, if only because they are not occupying the same space."
Nah, booey. The space is a postulate. So if you postulate that they can't occupy the same space, they can't. If you postulate they can, they can. It's just a matter of you making up your mind about it.
So if we have somebody having difficulty with his language, difficulty with the universe around him, who is an avid student of general semantics—which is taught in every university in the land now, by the way ... They teach students that nobody really knows what anybody else is talking about, because every word means something different to everybody else.
Aha, I'm afraid that "coffee" means coffee. Of course, it can have associative reasonings to it. You could have an association with coffee, but you've still said "coffee." "Coffee," the fellow says, "plus my associations with coffee"; the other fellow says, "Coffee, plus my associations with coffee"—you're still talking about coffee.
The general semanticist is always thinking in terms of associative lines and masses and definitions and reasons why, you see—significance, significance, significance, significance.
Now, I'm not tramping on general semantics. I'm glad General Semantics was around. I studied it for ten minutes once, and under a very, very good teacher, Robert Heinlein. He told me all about General Semantics, and I was very happy to learn about General Semantics. Several general semanticists since have undertaken my education, and they have quit with horror because they get just up to this point—they are not physicists or they have never studied the physical universe—they get up to this point of they say, "Now, you understand that two things cannot possibly occupy the same space."
Oh, I'm afraid that we're at a divergence right at this point. That's the way you make a universe solid. That's how these general semanticists get ridges around. That's why they get tongue-tied and go out of communication. They get this repostulated, repostulated, repostulated—that two things can't occupy the same space—and that makes an energy mass, that makes terminals, that makes all sorts of weird things, see?
That gives you a universe. In addition to this fellow having a physical universe, you're asking him to build a universe again around himself, in his mind.
Words, to a general semanticist, become lumps of lead. Everything takes on a mass form. It naturally would, because that's how you make mass, isn't it? "Two things cannot occupy the same space," you say. Therefore, by postulate, that terminal is over there and this terminal is here. You have to first say, however, if you're going to get these terminals apart, "Two things can't occupy the same space." You have to say that, see; you have to postulate that. "These two things are apart and they cannot occupy each other's space."
This will make them, each one of them, a unit object. We've got two unit objects now, and we've got individuation. See? We say these two things are entirely separate. Each one has a personality. Why? They've got to go on having a personality to the end of time. Why? Because they can't occupy the same space.
This is a very important thing to know in processing, because your fellow who is sitting there having a lot of difficulty—he is a thetan exteriorized, and he's got big masses of energy around him—there's only one common denominator to the things he's convinced of. Of course, he's convinced they're energy, convinced there's space and so forth, naturally, but much more important than that postulate is this basic consideration—this basic consideration: He considers that two things cannot occupy the same space.
For instance, he does not believe that he and his wife could occupy the same space. She is an individual, he is an individual. Oh, wait a minute. You'd have to be way downstairs in kindergarten not to have gone in somebody else's head and pulled a couple of motor controls, one way or one time or another.
Sure, he as a thetan can occupy somebody else's space, but it's only by postulate that his body and his wife's body cannot occupy the same space; that's what makes them two different individuals. You break that postulate down and Lord knows what's going to happen. Actually, you get freedom, because it's the basic restriction.
All aberration is, is restriction. And that is the fundamental common denominator of all restriction: Two things cannot occupy the same space.
All right, how important is this? Why are we stressing it? Is it an important theory? No. I tell you, I have enough theories ... I have a file in here which is called "Old Cuffs," and there is enough theory and speculation and so forth on those—so much so that we decided to start to photostat them on the backs of the wasted pages of the PABs. You know, just have them shoot an "Old Cuff" at random.
Boy, is that going to take some of these boys who figure-figure out in the field and throw them for a loop, because some of these things are not sequitur to anything we're doing—you know, they're just suppositions and so forth.
Theories: nobody will ever have to remedy my havingness in terms of theories. There's no scarcity of them. There are just billions of theories. That's the one thing I'm perfectly willing to agree on—that there could be more theories than there are coyotes. And that's a lot of theories. Any-how...
When we have this postulate in the bank, a person who firmly believes it, cannot believe that he can exteriorize. Because if he believes two things cannot occupy the same space, then it becomes impossible for him to assume that he is one thing and the body is another thing. Now, do you follow me? So he will have to tell you, if he's sitting in a body, that he is a body. You got that?
See, "Yeah, I'm right here! And two things can't occupy the same space, so I can't be occupying the same space as a body, can I?"
That logical? Well, it sounds logical enough to him so he won't exteriorize. And this is also your common denominator of non-exteriorization.
If you were to take R1-10, as a good process, how would you remedy his interiorization? You just keep asking him this question for hours and hours and hours and hours: "Give me some more things that could occupy the same space you're occupying. Some more things. Some more things. Some more things."
And all of a sudden he gets the creepy notion—because it's just a postulate on the track, you see; it's just a consideration like "ice cream is good" or "ice cream is bad"; it's just the same order of magnitude—all of a sudden he gets the sneaky notion that "You know, I'm sitting here occupying the space something else is occupying. But then, of course, I am no mass at all. Well, I am mass, and I don't quite ... But there's something here about this." And the next thing you'll know, he'll be three feet back of his head looking at himself.
So as an example of the workability of this particular process, the hold-outs (which is to say, the few who would not exteriorize cleanly) in the Advanced Clinical Course in London are reported to have exteriorized.
All the holdouts—you know, I think that he had maybe three or four there that were just dead in their heads, right there at the last. He exteriorized this whole unit, by the way. And he got down to R2-22. That was the total processes used—all of R1 and R2-22. That exteriorized everybody in that unit, I think, in the first two weeks of its teaching.
Now, the holdouts, the people who were having difficulty, blew on this one: "Give me something you wouldn't mind occupying your same space. Give me something you wouldn't mind occupying your same space. Give me some-thing else that you wouldn't mind occupying your same space." See? And they finally blew out of their heads.
It's obvious to an individual who is interiorized that he is his body, be-cause he knows two things cannot occupy the same space. That's the first thing you want to learn about that.Hubbard, L. R. (1954, 10 October). Route 1 Step 10. Route One Lectures, (5410C10). Lecture conducted from Phoenix, Arizona.
Korzybski (and Parsons, above) differed radically from Hubbard in that they were both adamant about treating man holistically, whereas Hubbard sought in Scientology to separate thetans from their bodies, so that he and his underlings could get inside their heads and control them.
It is quite natural that with the advance of experimental science some generalizations should appear to be established from the facts at hand. Occasionally, such generalizations, when further analysed, are found to contain serious structural, epistemological and methodological implications and difficulties. In the present work one of these empirical generalizations becomes of unusual importance, so important, indeed, that Part III of this work is devoted to it. Here, however, it is only possible to mention it, and to show some rather unexpected consequences which it entails.
That generalization states: that any organism must be treated as-a-whole; in other words, that the organism is not an algebraic sum, a linear function of its elements, but always more than that. It is seemingly little realized, at present, that this simple and innocent-looking statement involves a full structural revision of our language, because that language, of great pre-scientific antiquity, is elementalistic, and so singularly inadequate to express non-elementalistic notions. Such a point of view involves profound structural, methodological, and semantic changes, vaguely anticipated, but never formulated in a definite theory. The problems of structure, 'more', and 'non-additivity' are very important and impossible to analyse in the old way.
If this generalization be accepted - and on experimental, structural, and epistemological grounds we cannot deny its complete structural justification - some odd consequences follow; that is to say, odd, as long as we are not accustomed to them. For instance, we see that 'emotion' and 'intellect' cannot be divided, that this division structurally violates the organism-as-a-whole generalization. We must, then, choose between the two: we must either abandon the organism-as-a-whole principle, or abandon accepted speculations couched in el verbal terms which create insoluble verbal puzzles. Something similar could be said about the distinction of 'body' versus 'soul', and other verbal splittings which have hampered sane advance in the understanding of ourselves, and have filled for thousands of years the libraries and tribunes of the world with hollow reverberations.
The solution of these problems lies in the field of structural, symbolic, linguistic, and semantic research, as well as in the fields of physics, chemistry, biology, psychiatry, because from their very nature these problems are structural.Korzybski, A. (1933). Science and Sanity, pp. 64-65. Brooklyn, NY: Institute of General Semantics.